Abstract-A key question in the design of engineered competitive systems has been that of the efficiency of the associated equilibria. Yet, there is little known in this regard in the context of stochastic dynamic games in a large population regime. In this paper, we revisit a class of noncooperative games, arising from the synchronization of a large collection of homogeneous oscillators. In [1], we derived a PDE model for analyzing the associated equilibria in large population regimes through a mean field approximation. Here, we examine the efficiency of the associated mean-field equilibria with respect to a related welfare optimization problem. We construct variational problems both for the noncooperative game and its centralized counterpart and employ these problems as a vehicle for conducting this analysis. Using a bifurcation analysis, we analyze the variational solutions and the associated efficiency loss. An expression for the efficiency loss is obtained. Finally, our results are validated through detailed numerics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computation of optimal or approximate control laws in large populations of coupled heterogeneous nonlinear systems is of interest in networked multiagent systems. Traditionally, the characterization of the aggregate behavior of a large number of interacting particles is core to statistical mechanics. Through mean-field approximation techniques, the interactions of an agent with the ensemble may be reduced to that of the individual with the mass. The key to such an approximation lies in assuming that the fluctuations of the mass influence on the individual are "averaged out" when the number of agents grow to be infinite and importantly this mass-influence can effectively be viewed as a deterministic function. Consequently, this allows for any agent to make decisions based on on its state and the deterministic mass influence. Together with a consistency requirement imposed by the mass-influence, the resulting problem in an infinite population setting can be reduced to a set of coupled PDEs. Such avenues have been employed in modeling networked resource allocation problems [2] , industry dynamics [3] , amongst others.
In an effort to obtain distributed control laws, Huang et al. [2] considered the associated game-theoretic problem corresponding to the original multiagent control problem. Crucial to such an approach is the need to quantify the efficiency loss in considering the associated game. It may be recalled that if an equilibrium to this game leads to no loss in social welfare, then this game is said to be efficient [4] , [5] . Huang et al. [2] address the efficiency question in the context of mean-field games with linear dynamics. In [1] , we considered the large-population game associated with the synchronization of a homogeneous population of oscillators, a class of mean-field games with nonlinear dynamics. In this paper, we study the efficiency of precisely such a class of games. Our setting remains consistent with that of our preceding work [1] in that we consider the synchronization of a large population of oscillators and employ a mean-field approximation that allows for examining the system when the number of oscillators grows to infinity. An oblivious control [3] strategy is obtained and represents an ε-Nash equilibrium for the finite population game. It must be emphasized that our efficiency analysis is carried out in the large population regime. Quantification of efficiency loss in finite player games has been studied in the context of routing [5] , resource allocation [4] and congested markets [6] .
In this paper, we construct two variational problems; of these, the first provides a solution to the coupled set of PDEs corresponding to the mean-field equilibrium while the second provides a solution to the centralized welfare optimization problem in the infinite-player regime. Through an examination of the associated nonlinear eigenvalue problems (EulerLagrange equations) for the variational formulation, we relate the solutions to the optimization problem and the game. An expression for the efficiency loss associated with the game is provided and its validity is supported through a numerical example.
The second part of the paper pertains to the analysis of phase transitions, a recurring characteristic of nonlinear systems. These transitions are of relevance across a range of applications; for example, in thalamocortical circuits in the brain, transition to the synchronized state is associated with diseased brain states such as epilepsy [7] , [8] . We use the method from bifurcation analysis to obtain the critical point where phase transition starts. Additionally, this analysis leads to locally valid bounds on the efficiency loss. This paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief background to our problem and define the game-theoretic problem and its associated centralized optimization problem in Sec. II. We present two variational problems in Sec. III whose solutions provide us with system behavior in the infinite population limit. This paves the way for investigating the solutions to the two nonlinear eigenvalue problems through the methods of bifurcation theory in Sec. IV. Finally, we provide some numerical results in Sec. V.
II. PRELIMINARIES & PROBLEM STATEMENT
We begin with a review of the game-theoretic problem and the associated centralized or welfare optimization problem.
A. Game-theoretic problem
We consider a set of N homogeneous oscillators, denoted by N := {1, . . . , N}. The dynamics for the i th oscillator is described by the stochastic differential equation (SDE):
where θ i (t) is the phase of the i th oscillator at time t, u i (t) is the control input, and {ξ i (t), i ∈ N } are mutually independent standard Wiener processes.
We consider an N−player noncooperative game, denoted by G N , where we assume that the i th oscillator minimizes its own performance objective, given the decisions of (competing) oscillators:
is the cost function of the following separable form:
and the following assumption is made for c • : (3) is assumed to be a bounded function that is 1) spatially invariant, i.e., c
The form of the function c and the value of R are assumed to be common to the entire population. A Nash equilibrium in control policies is given by {u * i } i∈N such that u * i minimizes η
. . , N. Our interest in this paper on the regime where N → ∞. We refer to the infinite-player counterpart of the dynamic game by G ∞ . As shown in [1] , a mean-field approximation leads to the following PDE-based characterization of the equilibria:
where h(θ ,t) is the relative value function, p(θ ,t) is intended to approximate probability density of the random variable θ i (t), evolving according to the SDE (1) with the optimal control law
The equation (6) represents the mean-field approximation:
We conclude this section by defining the mean field equilibrium, an equilibrium of G ∞ . Definition 1: A triple (p * , h * , η * ) is said to be a meanfield equilibrium (MFE) of G ∞ if it is a solution of (4)-(6).
B. Welfare optimization problem
Given our interest in the efficiency of the equilibrium, we consider the N−player social welfare optimization problem, denoted by W N , given succinctly by a related centralized optimization problem. Under the validity of the interchange, this objective of this problem may be expressed as follows.
The welfare optimization problem requires the minimization of
; if not, then the loss in efficiency is captured by the difference. We emphasize that our interest lies in examining the efficiency loss of equilibria to G ∞ with respect to the associated welfare optimization problem W ∞ .
C. Specific solutions
In this paper, we restrict our attention to solutions of the following type:
giving us two special cases: If p(·), h(·) are constant functions, we refer to the solution as an equilibrium solution; If they are 2π-periodic, we refer to the solution as the traveling wave solution with wave speed a = 1. The equilibrium and traveling wave solutions are important in that they potentially represent the incoherence and synchrony solutions described in the coupled oscillators literature [9] , [10] . Using the assumption that u i in (7) is 2π-periodic, the control may be obtained in terms of the density function p from FPK equation (5) through the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose (p, h) is a 2π-periodic solution of the type (9) . Then the control input (see (7)) is given by 
III. VARIATIONAL PROBLEMS AND EFFICIENCY LOSS

A. Variational formulation of G ∞
Consider the following variational problem:
The solutions of this problem are characterized by the following: Lemma 2: Suppose v is a critical point of (11)- (12) . Then v is a solution of
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (12) . Proof: The result follows from consideration of the first variation of (11)- (12) .
Our interest lies in the constrained variational problem; more specifically, we are interested in critical points to (11)- (12) satisfying the additional requirement
We refer to the constrained variational problem as (V G ∞ ).
, the space of twice continuously differentiable nonnegative real-valued periodic functions on [0, 2π]. In the following definition, V denotes as the subspace of functions v(∈ X) that satisfy the density constraint (12) .
From Lemma 2, we obtain the necessary conditions of optimality. Furthermore, the Lagrange multiplier is seen to be exactly equal to the optimal value of the variational problem.
Lemma 3: Suppose (c * , v * ) is a solution of (V G ∞ ), corresponding to (11)- (12), and λ * is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. Then (c * , v * , λ * ) is a solution of the problem (13)-(15) and
is an MFE of the dynamic game G ∞ , under the mean field approximation and the traveling wave ansatz (9) .c * is the corresponding function given by (6) . Then (c * , v * ) is a solution to (V G ∞ ). Proof: The two cost terms in the integrand of (16), given by
can be simplified as follows: (i) The cost function c(θ i ; θ −i ) is replaced by its mean-field approximationc(θ ,t) as in (6). (ii) We assume (p(θ ,t), h(θ ,t)) is a traveling wave solution with wave speed 1. In this case,
From lemma 1, we have a relationship between the optimal control u i and the density p:
2 ∂ θ ln(p). Substituting this in (16), we obtain the approximation of η
Since θ i (s) is an ergodic process (See Prop. 3.1 [11] ), the time average may be replaced by its expectation
Substituting back in (17), we obtain
With a change of coordinate v 2 (θ ) = p(θ ), we arrive at the formula for η g (v;c) in (11) . Since p = v 2 and p is a density function, we obtain the constraint (12) . Finally, the constraint (15) is the consistency requirement of the mean field approximation. The next result further clarifies the relationship and shows how an MFE of G ∞ may be constructed from a solution of (V G ∞ ) and vice-versa. Proposition 1: Suppose (v, λ ) is a solution of (V G ∞ ) satisfying (13)-(15). Then an MFE of G ∞ , satisfying the coupled nonlinear PDEs (4)- (6), is given by
with average cost η * = λ . Conversely, suppose (p, h, η * ) is an MFE of G ∞ of the type (9) to (4)- (6) . Then it is a solution of (V G ∞ ) of the form (19) where (v, η * ) is a solution of (13)-(15).
Proof: Suppose (p, h, η * ) is a solution of the type (9). For such a solution, the left hand side of the FPK and the HJB PDEs,
We denote u * = − 1 R ∂ θ h and using (20), the FPK equation (5) is given by
where K is the constant of integration. Now, u * = − i.e., K = 0 and
Using (20), the HJB equation (4) is given by
We introduce the Hopf-Cole transformation coordinate v as
to simplify the HJB equation (23) to
Finally, using (22) and (24), we obtain
This gives p = v 2 , where we have dropped the constant of integration because h is defined only up to a constant.
We thus obtain the eigenvalue problem expressed only in terms of v:
with the constraint that v 2 (θ ) dθ = 1 because p = v 2 is a density.
In summary, solutions of G ∞ can be obtained by considering one of two problems:
1) The variational problem (11)- (12) with constraint (15);
2) The nonlinear eigenvalue problem (13)-(15).
B. Variational formulation of W ∞
As in the game-theoretic problem, we consider the following variational problem (V W ∞ ) as a means of obtaining a mean-field optimum (MFO) of W ∞ , associated with (8) . This problem requires a v ∈ X so as to minimize
where C (v) is defined in (15). Theorem 2: Consider an MFO of W ∞ , i.e. a solution to W ∞ (8) of the type (9) . Any MFO of W ∞ is a solution to the variational problem (V W ∞ ) given by (25)-(26).
Ru 2 dθ ds
using the mean-field approximation (6) and traveling wave ansatz (9) as in proof of Thm. 1. Then
The traveling wave ansatz (9) also gives u = σ 2 2 ∂ θ ln(p) as stated in lemma 1. Consequently, I 2 may be simplified as
Substituting (28)- (29) into (27), we obtain η w (p) as
Making a change of coordinate v 2 (θ ) = p(θ ), we arrive at the formula for η w (v) in (25). Because p = v 2 is a density function, we obtain the constraint (26). Denote the average cost obtained this way as η * w , i.e., η * w := min v∈V η w (v). The Euler-Lagrange results are summarized as follows:
Lemma 4: Suppose v is a solution of (V W ∞ ), given by (25)-(26). Then (v, λ ) satisfy the following:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (26). Furthermore, Multiply both sides of (30) by v and integrate from 0 to 2π to obtain 
C. Efficiency loss
The efficiency loss is denoted by ∆ η (R; σ ) and is given by η * g (R; σ ) − η * w (R; σ ). Our main result of this subsection is twofold in nature. First, we provide a precise relationship between an MFE and an MFO, in terms of v and λ . Second, using these these relationships, we then construct an expression for ∆ η (R).
Theorem 3: Let σ be fixed. For a given value of R, let (c * , v * g (R)) be the solution of (V G ∞ ), λ * g (R) be the corresponding Lagrange multiplier, v * w (R) be the solution to the variational problem (V W ∞ ) and λ * w (R) be the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. Then we have
Proof: Denote problem (13) as G g (v, λ , R) = 0 and problem (30) as G w (v, λ , R) = 0. Consider the problem G w (v w , λ w , R w ) = 0. Suppose R w = 2R and λ w = 2λ . Then we obtain the relationship
That is to say, to solve the problem G w (v w , λ w , R) = 0, we could instead solve the equivalent problem
The formula for ∆ η is obtained from its definition using the relationship in (i) and lemma 4.
There are several insights that one can draw from the expression for ∆ η (R), particularly from the numerical study. We observe that as R → 0, we have that η * w and η * g both tend to zero. In effect, the efficiency loss tends to zero, as R → 0. Furthermore, when R is beyond a threshold, we again observe that the efficiency loss is zero. In fact, the efficiency loss is seen to be positive between these two regimes. In the next section, through a bifurcation analysis, we provide a locally valid upper bound on efficiency loss (Lemma 7).
IV. BIFURCATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the solutions of the nonlinear eigenvalue problems (13)-(15) and (30)-(31) by using the methods of bifurcation theory and conclude with a bound on the efficiency loss.
We denote Y := C 0 2π ([0, 2π], R), the space of continuous nonnegative real-valued periodic functions on [0, 2π]. Recall X := C 2 2π ([0, 2π], R + ). The eigenvalue problem (Denoted as (EP α )) comprises of a nonlinear operator G α : X × R + × R + → Y, and a constraint B : X → R:
where C (v) is defined in (15) and α = 1, 2. When α = 1, it is the problem (13)-(15), while when α = 2, it is the problem (30)-(31). For any fixed R ∈ R + , we are interested in obtaining
For the nonlinear eigenvalue problem, we define the incoherence solution
About the incoherence solution, the linearization of (33) is given by
withṽ ∈ X and satisfies the integral constraint 2π 0ṽ (θ ) dθ = 0.
The spectrum of the linear operator L R : X → Y is summarized in the following:
Lemma 5: Consider the linear eigenvalue problem L R v = sv. Suppose the Fourier expansion of the function c • is
Then the spectrum consists of eigenvalues
. . The eigenspace for the k th eigenvalue s = s k is given by span{cos(kθ ), sin(kθ )}.
As the parameter R varies, the potential bifurcation points are where an eigenvalue crosses zero. The k th such bifurcation point is given by
Example 1: Consider now the function c • (θ − ϑ ) = is the critical point at which the incoherence solution loses stability. We state the bifurcation result for a specific cost function c • next. The similar proof can be found in [11] . . We substitute the expansion R = r 0 + εr 1 + ε 2 r 2 + . . .
into (33)-(34), and collect the terms according to different orders of ε. The results are summarized in the following lemma. The calculations can be found in the extended version on authors' website. Using the asymptotic formula from lemma 6 and the formula of ∆ η (R) in Thm. 3, we obtain an upper bound for the efficiency loss around the critical value of R 1 c . Lemma 7: In a sufficiently small neighborhood of R = R 1 c = 1 2σ 4 , the following bound holds for ∆ η :
where
V. NUMERICS
In this section we present the numerical results of the nonlinear eigenvalue problems (33)-(34) for c
We set the noise level at σ 2 = 0.1. The results of the solutions p and the average cost η * from LyapunovSchmidt perturbation method as well as those from the AUTO software are depicted for comparison. 
a)
Relationship of p and λ with R: Figure 1 depicts the bifurcation diagram for the Lagrange multiplier λ as a function of the bifurcation parameter R as well as the function of p for a particular value of R (R = 10 for (EP 1 ) and R = 22.8 for (EP 2 )). For comparison, we also depict the corresponding numerical results of the problem that is obtained in AUTO using a continuation method [12] . The first row is the results for (EP 1 ) while the second is for (EP 2 ). This verifies the perturbation calculation results of Sec. IV.
b) Relationship of η with R: Next, we compare the average cost (η * g for (EP 1 ) and η * w for (EP 2 )) obtained from solving the two nonlinear eigenvalue problems using AUTO. For (EP 1 ), we know η * g = λ from lemma 3. For (EP 2 ), we know η * w from lemma 4. The results are depicted in Fig. 2  (Left) . There are two critical points in the figure: One is R 1 c for (EP 1 ) and the other is R 2 c for (EP 2 ). When R > R 2 c (R −1/2 < (R 2 c ) −1/2 ), we obtain the incoherence solution for both problems. When R < R 1 c (R −1/2 > (R 1 c ) −1/2 ), we obtain the synchrony solution for both problems. The figure shows η * g ≥ η * w . The equality holds when both are in incoherence solution, i.e., R > R 2 c . c) Relationship of ∆ η with R: We calculate the difference of the average cost (efficiency loss) ∆ η for the case of R < R 1 c . The difference is calculated by two methods. One is the method stated in Thm. 3 (ii) and the other is the definition. The results are depicted in Fig. 2 (Right) . It shows that the formula for ∆ η (R) in Thm. 3 is quite accurate, and the solution of (V G ∞ ) is always inefficient except in the incoherent regime. From the numerics, we obtain that ∆ η /η * w < 20%. 
